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ABSTRACT
The potential implications of using the family as opposed to the individual as the
unit of taxation are not clear. This applies both to work incentives and distributional
outcomes. In this paper we evaluate the effects of a hypothetical reform of Italian in-
come taxation both on labour supply incentives and on redistribution of income be-
tween families with different composition and income levels. In particular, we ana-
lyze the potential effects of a shift from the current system of individual taxation to
a system of family taxation similar to the French family-splitting approach by imple-
menting a tax-benefit model. Based on data from the Bank of Italy Survey of House-
hold Income and Wealth, our simulations show a reduction in the degree of progres-
sivity and a disincentive for the labour supply of additional earners within the fami-
ly.
JEL: H24, H31, J08, J16
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Introduction
Low female labour force participation across the European Union has been
an issue of continued concern since the Eighties, and emerged as a specific
policy-issue in the Lisbon Strategy1. There are indeed huge differences across
Member States in the share of employed women, currently standing at around
40 percent in southern European countries (i.e. Spain, Italy and Greece) and
above 65 percent in the Nordic countries (Table 1). The problem is even more
astonishing in Italy, where the participation and employment rates are the low-
est of the EU15 members (only Malta has a lower indicator within EU25).
Growth in female employment rates in Italy is clearly inadequate, as it was
only 10 percent between 1995 and 2005. This leaves Italy 15 percentage
points below the Lisbon target, and compared to Spain and Ireland, where the
growth figures were 20 and 16 percent respectively, progress has been poor. 
While there is agreement on the need to increase female employment rates
in Europe, it is not clear how this can be best achieved. Part-time jobs, tax
wedges, and childcare facilities are some of the policy instruments that are
widely discussed2. Substantial differences in the share of part-time jobs can be
found among Member States (ranging from 5% in Greece to 45% in Nether-
lands) and a similar variation can be found in fertility rates. It is argued that
the female labour supply and labour force participation rate is linked to fertili-
ty. In particular, there seems to be a correlation between high labour force par-
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1 In 2000, with the Lisbon Strategy, the European Union introduced a very ambitious
goal of raising the employment rate of both men and women by almost 10 percentage
points in ten years. Moreover, a specific target for women was defined: the employment
rate should rise to 60 per cent by 2010 (it was below 50% in 1995). 
2 On the positive relation between the employment rate, part-time job diffusion, fertility
and childcare facilities see, among many others, Boeri et al. (2005).
ticipation (thanks to specific labour market policies) on the one hand, and high
fertility on the other. The Scandinavian countries provide good examples of
this pattern (Koegel 2006). 
Interestingly, however, within the European Union there is much stronger
uniformity in terms of the tax wedge than there is for employment or fertility
rates3. In the light of this, an interesting comparison can be made between the
three largest continental European countries: France, Germany and Italy. All
three countries have similar average tax rates for labour income (they are con-
sidered high tax countries) but France and Germany have a family taxation
system whereas Italy applies individual taxation. Moreover, Italy and Germany
are both characterised by low fertility; Germany has high female employment
rate, while France is the only country characterized by relatively high levels of
both indicators. These differences explain why tax reforms focusing on the
treatment of marriage and children are often proposed as a policy that could be
used to influence both fertility and work incentives for mothers. In this debate,
increasing attention has been devoted to the French Family Splitting system4. 
The Italian income tax introduced in 1974 (Irpef) was based on family in-
come, but in 1976 the Constitutional Court delivered a judgement against
combined income taxation. From this point onwards the tax unit became the
individual, and household dependents (the spouse and/or the children) are tak-
en into account by means of tax allowances and tax credits5. However, a move
back to the family system has been proposed several times6 and it is still high-
ly topical in Italy, mainly with regard to the possible effects on income distrib-
ution for households of different size and income level7. In contrast, the debate
in France and Germany seems to focus on tax reform effects on the female
labour participation rate. As an example, Bargain and Moreau (2003) simulate
the effect on labour supply of a change in the French tax unit – from family to
individual – using a collective framework model. In a similar way, Beninger,
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3 The explicative role of taxes in the employment differential between the US and Eu-
rope has been widely debated. For recent contributions see Prescott (2004) and Rogerson
(2007)
4 Most OECD countries employ an individual base of personal income taxation as Italy,
Sweden, Finland, Netherlands, Austria and Great Britain. In Belgium, Ireland and Germany
options for a splitting system are in force, whereas in France, Portugal and Luxembourg
compulsory splitting systems are in force. In the US, the federal income tax base is the
household combined income and two different tax rates and brackets are in force for single
taxpayer and couples. From the third tax rates, brackets in force for couples are less than
the double of those for singles and the system implies a disadvantage for the former, said
marriage tax. See Longobardi (2005) and Di Nicola (2006) for further details.
5 The disadvantage of single earners in comparison with the treatment of dual earner
families was underlined by the Constitutional Court in two later sentences. 
6 Visco (1991) , Marenzi (1995), Oneta (2004), Campiglio and Tartamella (2004), ISAE
(2004), Tutino (2005), Di Nicola (2003 e 2006) and Larcinese (2005).
7 In Larcinese (2005), where the labour supply is specifically modelled, the main inter-
est concerns the Lorenz dominance of net incomes.
Laisney and Beblo (2003) compare unitary and collective models of labour
supply to test the labour supply effect of changing the tax unit in Germany –
again from family to the individual. In a more general perspective, Waghenals
(2000) studies the incentive effects of the 2000 German tax reform on female
and male labour force participation. A contribution by Baclet, Dell and
Wrohlinh (2005), simulates the adoption of French family splitting in Ger-
many: in this case the main issue is the fertility target, given that in terms of
female work incentives and participation levels the French and German split-
ting systems are similar. 
The aim of this paper is not to discuss whetter a female labour participation
increase may improve the social welfare or whetter  household production
should be recorded in the national product, neither whetter  a taxation system
may influence fertility decisions. Our purpose is to evaluate the impact of a
hypothetical shift from individual income taxation to family taxation in Italy
by using microsimulation analysis. Redistributive effects will be taken into ac-
count by considering average tax rates and family characteristics; work-related
effects will be discussed starting from an estimation of the labour supply. The
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Table 1 – Employment rates by gender
1995 2000 2005 1995 2000 2005 1995 2000 2005
Male Female Total
EU15 70,5 72,8 72,9 49,7 54,1 57,4 60,1 63,4 65,2
BE 66,9 69,5 68,3 45,0 51,5 53,8 56,1 60,5 61,1
DK 79,9 80,8 79,8 66,7 71,6 71,9 73,4 76,3 75,9
DE 73,7 72,9 71,2 55,3 58,1 59,6 64,6 65,6 65,4
GR 72,5 71,5 74,2 38,1 41,7 46,1 54,7 56,5 60,1
ES 62,5 71,2 75,2 31,7 41,3 51,2 46,9 56,3 63,3
FR 67,2 69,2 68,8 52,1 55,2 57,6 59,5 62,1 63,1
IE 67,1 76,3 76,9 41,6 53,9 58,3 54,4 65,2 67,6
IT 66,9 68,0 69,9 35,4 39,6 45,3 51,0 53,7 57,6
NL 75,3 82,1 79,9 53,8 63,5 66,4 64,7 72,9 73,2
AT 78,5 77,3 75,4 59,0 59,6 62,0 68,8 68,5 68,6
PT 73,5 76,5 73,4 54,4 60,5 61,7 63,7 68,4 67,5
FI 64,2 70,1 70,3 59,0 64,2 66,5 61,6 67,2 68,4
SE 73,1 75,1 74,4 68,8 70,9 70,4 70,9 73,0 72,5
UK 75,1 77,8 77,6 61,7 64,7 65,9 68,5 71,2 71,7
US 79,5 80,6 77,6 65,8 67,8 65,6 72,5 74,1 71,5
JP 81,9 80,9 80,4 56,4 56,7 58,1 69,2 68,9 69,3
Source: Eurostat.
paper will be organised as follows: Section 2 presents the pros and cons of
family and individual taxation from a theoretical point of view. Section 3 de-
scribes the tax benefit microsimulation model and the dataset employed. Sec-
tion 4 discusses the results of a simulation of a hypothetical change from an
individual to a family taxation system. In Section 5 some gender-differentiated
labour supply estimations are presented in order to gain some elements for the
discussion of a tax reform. Section 6 concludes.
1. Progressive income tax: individual or family tax unit?
It is worthwhile to start by reviewing the tax implications of individual ver-
sus family (or joint) taxation. In the former case, income tax is applied sepa-
rately to each family member and tax concessions are employed for dependent
children and spouses, if any. Formally, in a household with two wage earners
the tax schedule is applied to each personal income and the household average
rate is the ratio between the sum of the two individual taxes and the overall in-
come of the couple, as follows:
where:
tIaf is the family average tax rate, under individual taxation;
y1,2 are individual incomes;
T1,2 = f(y1,2, e) are the tax due by each spouse following the individual tax
schedule;
e is indivual tax allowances and/or tax credits
Under individual taxation, marginal tax rates are different for each spouse,
depending on their individual incomes (y1 and y2).
Family taxation is generally applied as a splitting system8, where the tax
rates are applied to a tax base built by summing all the incomes and dividing
the result by a specific divisor (p), as follows:
where:
tFaf is the average household rate, adopting family taxation
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8 However, in Italy until 1976 family taxation was applied as pure joint taxation, i.e. the
tax schedule was applied to the overall income and the average rate was simply a function
of the sum of the incomes of the couple. 
TF is the tax due by the family and is equal to 
In this case the two spouses’ marginal rates are equal.
There are two main splitting schemes in use in European countries: the
German splitting system and the French family splitting system. In the former,
the income tax of a married couple is calculated by applying the tax function
to half of the total incomes (p = 2)9, and the tax due by the family is calculat-
ed by doubling this amount. 
In France the total family income is divided by a number that differs ac-
cording to household size. In other words, the divisor p is a sum of different
coefficients, one for each member of the household: 
where ci is the coefficient representing member i of the household. 
This «family quotient» is computed on the basis of an equivalence scale,
with a value of 2 for a couple (ci = 1 for each adult), 0.5 for the first two chil-
dren and a weight of one applied to each additional child: for a family with
two spouses and two children the family quotient would be three, as shown in
the Table below (drawn from the French Code des Impots). This means that
under the French system the taxable income for a single (without spouse and
dependent children) is three times the tax base of a couple with two children
and an identical income level.
The French splitting divisor is of interest for at least two reasons. First, the
number of wage earners in a couple is not relevant to the overall tax burden,
194
9 In this case the household size, including the number of dependent children, is taken
into account by tax concessions, as in all the other individual taxation systems.
. 
 
 
 
Table 2 – The splitting divisors in use in France in 2003
Civil status Without dependent Number of dependent people
people 1 2 3 4 5
Married 2 2.5 3 4 5 6
Widower 1 1.5 2 3 4 5
Single/divorced 1 1.5 2 3 4 5
Source: Code General des Impots, 2003.
since the divisor is a function of the components of the family and is not
linked to the number of earners. Secondly, a significant tax favour for depen-
dent children is provided after the second child: starting from the third child a
unitary increase of the divisor is envisaged for each new member being cared
for, producing a higher reduction of the fiscal burden than that caused by the
first two children. This implies that after the third child the economy of scale
is ignored and children are considered as adults.
Clearly the tax unit is important and can affect several economic and social
dimensions of behaviour. It might for instance have an impact on tax compli-
ance, and in general it is acknowledged that the individual tax system gives
more room for avoidance, mainly due to fictitious income shares among fami-
ly members. 
The systems will also have different impacts on incentives to legalize
unions through marriage. If the individual tax system can be considered neu-
tral, a family taxation system can exhibit either a deterrent or an incentive –
depending on the exact details of the systems in place. 
There is also a difference for families with children. Family taxation offers
a more beneficial treatment of large families, due to the lower average tax rate;
however, a system of tax credits with a high incentive for children can also be
modelled in the individual taxation system. 
Under the two taxation systems, incentives for work effort to the additional
earner are different. Essentially, family taxation deters the labour supply of ad-
ditional family members10. The influence on the work effort or, more specifi-
cally, on the decision to enter the work force, stems from the different margin-
al effective tax rates that the secondary earner faces in the two tax regimes.
More precisely, the two spouses’ marginal rates in family taxation are exactly
the same and they are equivalent to the household marginal rate; on the con-
trary, under an individual system, marginal rates are related to individual in-
comes. 
Table 3 shows examples of average and marginal tax rates under different
hypotheses of income levels (20.000, 40.000 and 125.000 euros) and income
concentration among spouses (1:1, 2:1 and 1:0, or single earner family). The
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10 From an efficiency point of view, optimal income taxation theory would favour indi-
viduals rather than households as the unit tax. In fact, the traditional Ramsey optimal taxa-
tion principle suggests taxing secondary workers at lower rates with respect to primary
workers, because the labour supply elasticity of secondary workers is higher (for a survey
see Blundell and McCurdy, 1999). Under a progressive individual taxation system, primary
earners have higher incomes and higher marginal tax rates, while secondary earners face
lower marginal tax rates. On the contrary, in a joint-income tax system, tax rates are identi-
cal across members of the same family (see Mirrlees (1971) for a seminal contribution at
the individual level, and Boskin and Sheshinski (1983) for the extension at the family level.
The optimal taxation approach does not offer clear-cut prescriptions if differences across
families are taken into account or the household production function is considered. More-
over, under specific hypotheses on household decisions and welfare, joint taxation becomes
optimal (see among others Kleven et al. (2006) and Cremer et al. (2007)). 
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Table shows that in the case of equal income levels between spouses (top three
rows of Table 3) all the tax rates are identical under the two taxation systems.
If the ratio of incomes is 2:1 and the household income is 40000 euros, under
individual taxation the secondary earner faces a marginal rate equal to 24% –
much lower than the marginal tax rate (32%) under the family system. In a sin-
gle earner household (bottom three rows in the Table), at the same income lev-
el the effect is even more evident: if the non-working adult decided to enter the
job market, his/her marginal rate would be 18% under the individual system
and 32% under the family system. 
Finally, the two systems have an impact on the degree of progressivity:
when adopting the same marginal rates and brackets, progressivity becomes
stronger in an individual framework. In contrast, the average tax rate becomes
lower in the family taxation system due to the tax base abatement11. This is be-
cause the tax due in an individual and progressive taxation system is positive-
ly correlated with income concentration: the less egalitarian the income distri-
bution between the two spouses, the larger the tax burden becomes. Therefore,
for a given total family income under an individual taxation framework, the
tax burden is greater for single-earner families than for two-earner households.
Under a family taxation system, on the contrary, single earner and two-earner
families pay exactly the same amount of tax: for a total household income of
125.000 euro the average tax rate is the same in the family taxation system
whatever the income distribution between spouses (32,6%); on the contrary
under an individual tax system the average tax rate increases with income con-
centration (from 32.6 % to 38.4%). Summing up, individual taxation is neutral
with respect to the labour supply of the secondary earner, whereas the family
taxation system implies a disincentive for the secondary earner. The neutrality
of the individual tax system is straightforward in this simplified framework but
may be reduced when benefits and allowances are a decreasing function of
family income level, as are family allowances in the Italian system. This sim-
ple tax framework has been proposed also to illustrate the implicit reduction in
tax progressivity implied by the French system and shown by the average tax
rate differences. However in an hypothetical reform tax progressivity can be
amended by choosing different level of tax rates and tax allowances. 
2. A tax benefit microsimulation model
Our data come from the 2002 Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income
and Wealth. Net incomes recorded in the survey are transformed into gross-of-
tax amounts using a microsimulation model based on the Italian personal in-
come tax legislation in force in 200212. Though the share of self-employed in-
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11 If family taxation is under a splitting system and not a pure joint taxation system.
12 TAXPOL is a microsimulation model built at the Dipartimento di Studi sullo Stato
(University of Firenze). For a different application see Gastaldi et al. (2008). 
dividuals is substantial in Italy, the available data for their labour supply and
earnings are not completely reliable: this explains why we consider a sub-sam-
ple of families in which individuals work as employees (if not unemployed). 
As a result of the selection procedure, the dataset is composed of four cat-
egories of families:
1. couples of employees (with or without dependent children and other de-
pendent relatives);
2. couples with one employed and one unemployed (with or without children
and other dependent relatives);
3. single-parent families (employed or not employed and with children and
possibly other dependent relatives);
4. singles (employees and unemployed). 
The dataset, which after the aforementioned selection cannot be considered
representative of the Italian population, has 9066 individuals and 2.919 fami-
lies, as shown in Table 4. 
Families with relatives recorded as working (young adults or grandparents)
are included in the sub-sample because they may be important to explain
labour supply decisions, although these kinds of additional earners in the fam-
ily are not directly affected by the reform. Even when they live in a household,
their income tax does not change as they are considered as singles. As for the
splitting divisors, we chose those used in France in 2003, as previously illus-
trated in Table 2. 
The base scenario is obtained by applying the Personal Income tax in force
in Italy in 2002 (Table 5), including tax allowances related to family and work
status. In the family tax scenario, the household income, equal to the sum of
the spouses’ incomes, is divided by the splitting divisors outlined above in or-
der to obtain a new tax base. As a second step, the Italian personal income tax
schedule for 2002 (Table 5) is applied to this new tax base and, as a last step,
this provisional tax charge is multiplied by the divisor in order to obtain the to-
tal household tax. 
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Table 4 – Simulation dataset by household types
Two earners couples 991
Couples with a single earner 1011
Single parent, employed 288
Single parent and couples unemployed 227
Singles (employed or not) 402
Total 2919
Source: Authors’ estimation.
Finally, to calculate the net tax amount we consider tax credits related to
the work status of the taxpayer13, while tax credits for dependent children and
spouse are eliminated. In fact, we consider family splitting as an alternative to
the family-related tax credits in force in the Italian system. Summing up, we
keep the Italian tax schedule and work tax credits under the family tax sce-
nario as our aim is to highlight the effect of the transition from an individual
to a family income taxation system, without altering the legal brackets and
rates in force in Italy. In that way the transition from the individual to a fami-
ly taxation system automatically reduces the tax progression14. The aim of
this work, however, is not to evaluate the progressivity of the French system
if it were applied to the Italian income distribution, but to verify the effects of
the «family quotient» on families that are different for incomes and composi-
tion and to underline the labour supply incentives of a family taxation system,
considering that a transition from the individual system to the family system
may involve both a loss of revenues and a progressivity reduction. In this pa-
per the latter two effects are only measured considering the original tax
schedule. 
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13 More precisely, we allocate tax credits related to work status according to the gross
income of each spouse before calculating family gross income and family gross tax. As fi-
nal step, we reduce the family tax due by tax credits previously assigned. 
14 For a demonstration of the so-called «grin from splitting» see Richter and Hampe
(1984) or Lambert (1993). 
Table 5 – Marginale rates, income brackets, tax credit of Irpef 2002
Income brackets Marginal Rates (%) Employees tax credit First child tax credits
Up to 10329 euros 18 22 brackets. The higher 516.46 up to 36152 euros
From 10329 to 15494 euros 24 tax credit decreases 303.68 from 36152
From 15494 euros to 30987 euros 32 from 1146,53 for incomes to 51646 euros
From 30987 euros to 69722 euros 39 under 6197 euros to 51,65 285.08 more than 51646
More than 69722 euros 45 for incomes more than
51646 euros
Two children tax credit Three children Fourth and more Dependent spouse
tax credit children tax credit tax credit
516.46 up to 41317 1549.4 up to 516,46 euros for 546,2 euros up to
46481 euros each child 15494 euros
41317 to 51646 977 from 46481 496,6 from 15494
to 51646 euros to 30987 euros
285 more than 51646 855 more than 459,4 from 30987
51646 euros to 51646 euros
422,2 more than
51646 euros
Source: Italian Ministry of Finance.
3. Microsimulation and fiscal analysis
A tax benefit model simply measures the change in the budget constraint
that households face because of a fiscal reform without taking into account any
behavioural change. Starting from survey data and the socio-demographic
characteristics of households, these models arithmetically derive disposable
incomes and net tax payments given the official rules for the computation of
taxes and benefits in the policy being analysed. By using this kind of model
the analysis can be at least threefold. First of all, it is possible to calculate the
effect of the reform on revenues. Secondly, fiscal policies can be evaluated for
several typologies of households, with the objective of discerning the winners
and the losers after the reform. Finally, arithmetic models allow us to compare
different taxation system or, generally speaking, the impact of reforms with re-
gard to income distribution. This kind of evaluation is done by comparing dif-
ferent net equivalent income distributions by means of inequality indices, and
taking the household equivalent gross income distribution as the starting point.
In all these analyses, the behavioural responses are ignored and the results can
be considered as ex-ante evaluations, in the sense that the reaction of econom-
ic agents to each policy is not taken into account. Behavioural models over-
come this limitation, as they include a detailed representation of the behav-
ioural response of individuals and households to changes in their budget con-
straint. The type of behaviour taken into account differs across models, al-
though consumption, labour supply and portfolio choices are the most frequent
focuses of interest. However, behavioural models are usually structural mod-
els, but their computational burden is beyond the scope of this paper15. For this
reason we present the microsimulation results, and then we add some qualita-
tive considerations based on non-structural labour supply estimations. 
3.1. Results of the arithmetical microsimulation of the reform
The simulation of the fiscal reform shows a loss in total income tax revenue
(-5.1 percent)16 confirming other empirical evidence from Italy17. However this
result is not homogeneously spread across the population as winners and
losers among Italian households can be identified. 
Generally speaking, the simulated reform shows a reduction in the tax lia-
bility of male taxpayers and an increase for female taxpayers, as women are
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15 See Colombino et al. (1999a, 1999b e 2000)
16 This result refers to individuals affected directly by the simulated tax reform. The
revenue loss decreases to 3,6 per cent if all income tax is considered, including individuals,
as singles, for which nothing changes with the simulated tax regime.
17 See Marenzi (1991), Ministero delle Finanze (1992), Declich and Polin (2004), Ra-
pallini (2005), Tutino (2005). 
usually the secondary earners18. Defining splitting gain19 as the difference be-
tween income tax due in a family system and that due in an individual system
and considering the average tax change for households, Figure 1 shows that there
is a splitting gain for a couple with two earners (the first category) and for one-
wage earner households (second category); contrary to the expected result, the
gain is higher for the first category. In contrast, single parent households (third
category) exhibit a splitting loss, in the sense that their tax liabilities are greater
under the simulated reform than the present Italian income tax system. A similar
splitting loss emerges also for households in which parents (single parents or
couples) are unemployed: this effect is driven by their very low income level20. In
fact, on the one hand their incomes are still in the first bracket both if income is
individually considered and if combined and the divisor effect is null; on the oth-
er hand, family-related tax credits in the base scenario are not in force in the fam-
ily tax scenario. As expected, Figure 1 shows a zero splitting gain for singles
(fifth category), employed or unemployed, because they are unaffected by the
simulated reform as their tax base is divided by one (p = 1). 
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18 In our sample in 86,4 % of the households there is a female secondary earner.
19 A splitting gain simplified analytical version is in the appendix.
20 In the sample, people who declare themselves unemployed at the time of the inter-
view usually worked only for a few months of the year.
Figure 1 – Splitting gain by household type
Source: Authors’ estimation.
The high splitting gain for two wage-earner couples can be explained by
the income level, considering that the model shows a higher gross average in-
come for the two wage-earner households than for the one wage-earner cate-
gory. 
As shown in Figure 2, the splitting gain in the simulation increases with
gross income; the effect of a higher gross income for the two-earner families
completely offsets the advantage of the concentration income effect of the sin-
gle earner households.
As for income distribution, the empirical result is consistent with the analy-
sis carried out in the first section: the splitting gain is positive for those house-
holds positioned after the fifth decile, while there is an increase in the tax due
for households located in the first four deciles21. 
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21 This effect on income distribution is confirmed by the Gini index trend. Starting from
a gross equivalent income index of 0.6750, the net equivalent income index in the individ-
ual scenario is 0.6538 whereas the index of the family scenario is 0.6591, showing the ex-
pected increase. Net and gross incomes for the two scenarios are defined «equivalent» be-
cause, before calculating the Gini index, they are divided by the OECD equivalence scale.
This scale assigns the value 1 to the first member of the household, 0.7 to all other adults,
and 0.5 to children.
Figure 2 – Splitting gain by deciles of household income
Source: Authors’ estimation.
As regards the link between splitting gain and family size, the simulation
shows that the reform is more advantageous for households with three and
four dependent children, while those with more than four dependent children
seem to gain less from this hypothetical reform. This apparently illogical re-
sult is, again, strictly related to income level distribution. Considering that in
Italy households with more than four dependent children are mainly located in
the first deciles of income distribution, the gain from French family splitting
due to a large number of children is offset by a low income level22. 
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22 The arithmetical microsimulation and the analysis by household type can also be per-
formed in a «neutral revenue scenario». In this case the introduction of French family split-
ting and a change in tax rates are simulated jointly so that total income tax revenue does not
decrease. However, infinite changes in tax rates can lead to a revenue-neutral reform from
an individual to a family taxation system. To check our results, we simulate a neutral-liabil-
ity progression tax change, following the methodology suggested in Lambert (1993). In
other words, in order to compensate for the revenue loss implied by the reform, all tax lia-
bilities are increased by a percentage which ensures the same pre-reform income tax rev-
enue. As for household type effects, the outcomes of the neutral revenue simulation are
very close to the simulation reported. 
Figure 3 – Splitting gain by households with different numbers of dependent children
Source: Authors’ estimation.
In addition, marginal tax rates can give some information on the labour in-
centives of the two tax systems considering the sample in use. By definition, a
marginal tax rate is the tax rate applied to the last unit of income, correspond-
ing to the change in tax due that results from a small change in income. Table
6 shows average marginal tax rates due to an income rise of 100 euros for each
adult, considering either the couple (i.e. the family) or the individual tax payer
(male or female). As expected, under a family taxation system each family
member faces the same marginal tax rates (equal to the family average mar-
ginal tax rate: 28.4 for the two-earner couples, 17.6 for couples with a single
earner, etc. ), whereas under individual taxation marginal tax rates are differ-
ent. In more depth, in two-earner couples, female marginal tax rate under indi-
vidual taxation is lower than those in the simulated scenario (26.9 vs. 28.4),
while in couple with a single earner marginal both female and male tax rates
are higher under individual taxation. In the single-parent case, if employed, in-
dividual taxation involves marginal tax rates higher than those in the family
regime, because the effect of the increasing divisor related to dependent chil-
dren is stronger than the family tax credits enjoyed. As far as singles are con-
cerned, the two scenarios are – as foreseen – equivalent. 
Focusing on job entry incentives, marginal tax rates for a wage entry level
of 10.000 euro have been computed for couples, single parent households and
singles if unemployed23. As singles are treated in the same way in the two
regimes, entry marginal tax rates are identical as expected. For couples, the
family tax system shows a marginal tax rate higher in all cases: this effect is
due to the fact that for a 10.000 euro income level family-related tax credits
under an individual system are more powerful with respect to the splitting ef-
fect. As regards single parent households, the difference between the family
average and the gender differentiated value is explained by the fact that in our
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23 The simulation considers that if one dependent spouse enter the labor market, the de-
pendent spouse tax credit and family allowances may be lost or reduced. 
Table 6 – Effective marginal tax rates, on average for family, women and men
Marginal rates
Family average Women Men
Family Individual Family Individual Family Individual
taxation taxation taxation taxation taxation taxation
Two earners couple 28.4 30.0 28.4 26.9 28.4 33.1
Couple with a single earner 17.6 26.9 17.6 20.1 17.6 27.0
Single parent employed 12.5 29.8 12.3 29.1 15.0 36.8
Single employed 30.4 30.4 31.3 31.3 29.5 29.5
Source: Authors’ calculations
dataset the number of dependent children is higher when the unemployed sin-
gle parent is a man24: as a consequence both the family system and the indi-
vidual system signal lower marginal tax rates for men.
4. A qualitative appraisal: wage and labour supply estimation
by gender
In this section we estimate labour supply functions for men and women in
order to gain some additional elements for a qualitative evaluation of the mi-
crosimulation analysis previously illustrated. 
As discussed in the introductory section of the paper, a sizeable proportion
of Italian women are out of the labour market and this raises concerns about po-
tential labour supply disincentives. As regards Italian regional heterogeneity,
Table 8 shows the employment rates25 for different regions of Italy by gender. 
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24 Even though the sample of male single parent unemployed is very small. 
25 The employment rate represents employed persons aged 15-64 as a percentage of the
same age population.
Table 7 – Job entry marginal tax rates, entry wage=10.000 euros
Marginal rates
Family average Women Men
Family Individual Family Individual Family Individual
taxation taxation taxation taxation taxation taxation
Couple unemployed 13.0 10.94 13.0 10.94 13.0 10.94
Single parent unemployed 5.37 10.11 5.44 10.12 3.58 9.99
Single unemployed 12.58 12.58 12.58 12.58 12.58 12.58
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Table 8 – Employment rates in the age group 15-64 years, simulation sample and official
statistics, 2002
Non working Working
Men North 7,9 92,1 100,0
Centre 11,4 88,6 100,0
South 24,9 75,1 100,0
Total 15,4 84,6 100,0
Total (official figure) 30,6 69,4 100,0
Women North 28,9 71,1 100,0
Centre 39,1 60,9 100,0
South 69,4 30,6 100,0
Total 47,2 52,8 100,0
Total (official figure) 55,3 44,7 100,0
Source: Authors’ estimation and Istat for official figures.
There is of course a large difference in employment rates among men and
women. Parts of these differences are explained by women staying at home to
care for children. However, it has also been argued that employment rates
among women are particularly low in Italy due to the lack of part-time jobs.
Interestingly, there are considerable differences between regions, both for men
and women. Parts of these differences are explained by the informal economy
in the south, which is considerably larger than in the North. 
Those not working are naturally coded as having zero wages in the survey.
In the labour supply function we are nevertheless interested in their predicted
wage, which can be thought of as the reservation wage. Thus, by estimating
the wage equation we are able to construct the predicted wages, which can
also be assigned for those not working. Women not participating in the labour
market may also be due to self-selection. Consequently, we tried several ver-
sions of the Heckman selection model. However, selection does not appear
significant in our sample, probably because of the selection procedure (exclud-
ing all families with self-employed workers). We settle therefore on a simpler
wage equation without controlling for selection effects. This is given by:
ln(Wi) = Xi b + ei,
where ln(Wi) is the logarithmic wage and vector Xi contains the set of individ-
ual characteristics. Estimations are performed separately for men and women.
The results are presented in Table 9. The estimates conform well with what
was expected. Age is positively associated with wages, but in a non-linear
way. Regions are important – the Centre and the South having significantly
lower wages than the North. Work status is also important for wages. Interest-
ingly, once we control for these background characteristics, the number of
children does not have a significant effect on women’s wage levels.
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Table 9 – Wage regressions by gender
Women Men 
Coefficients t stat Coefficients t stat
Age 0.0580 5.65 0.0491 6.91
Age squared -0.0005 -4.07 -0.0004 -4.88
Region 2 -0.0616 -1.84 -0.1234 -4.85
Region 3 -0.1684 -5.11 -0.2717 -12.6
Work Status
- level 2 0.2157 6.02
- level 3 0.4137 7.58
- level 4 0.3651 4.2
- level 5 0.5947 4.75
Educ. Years 0.0390 7.52 0.0552 21.6
Child 0.0880 3.72
Constant -0.1605 -0.79 0.1011 0.72
Notes: OLS estimates. Observations include total population between 18  and 66 for men
(2582cases )and between 18 and 63 for women (1594). Region 2 is the centre of Italy and
Region 3 is the south.
Source: Authors’ estimation.
The labour supply model is estimated by multinomial logistic regression.
This means that labour supply is divided into groups, each reflecting a certain
level of hours worked per week. The labour supply categories are different for
women and men, reflecting the actual labour supply distribution of the samples
(see Table 10). Four classes were chosen for men: 1) not working; 2) working
at least one hour per week but less than 40; 3) working 40 hours (i.e. full-
time); 4) working more than 40 hours. For women we use the following four
groups: 1) Not working, 2) Working at least one hour per week but less than
24, 3) working more than 23 hours but less than 40 hours, 4) working 40 hours
(i.e. full-time) or more. 
The parameter estimates for women are presented in Table 11. Most of the
estimates are as expected. We find that wages are positively associated with
labour supply, but in a highly non-linear way. For instance, the marginal effect
of the predicted wage for not working (i.e. the first labour supply group) is -
1.65, which indicates that women are less likely to stay out of the labour mar-
ket as wages increase. Moving on to the groups with positive labour supply,
we see a positive effect of predicted wages. The strongest effect is for the third
group, where the marginal effect is 0.79. The positive effect of wages declines
to 0.50 for the last group (i.e. at least 40 hours per week). 
There is also a control for the presence of children. This is done by con-
trolling for the presence of children younger than three years of age in the
household, and it confirms that labour supply is generally lower for women
with young children. The regions are also important. As reflected in Table 8,
the labour supply is clearly lower in the South, and for some groups also low-
er in the centre. Finally we see that non-labour income and other earners in
the household matter. This is especially the case for women not working.
Here the marginal effect of non-labour income and other earners is clearly
positive and significant; it is negative for all the other groups with positive
labour supply. 
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Table 10 – Hours worked frequency distribution (18-64 years)
Men Women
Freq. Perc. Freq. Perc.
0 413 13.60 0 1385 46.79
< 40 hours 742 24.41 < 24 hours 298 10.07
40 hours 1175 38.68 24 <hours< 40 609 20.57
> 40 hours 708 23.31 40 hours and more 668 22.57
Total 3038 100.00 Total 2960 100.00
Source: Authors’ estimation.
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We now move on to the labour supply estimation for men. Also here the
results are largely in line with our expectations. Before commenting on the
results, it is worthwhile reminding ourselves that compared to women, very
few men are out of the labour force. The predicted wage is negatively asso-
ciated with not working. As for women, the higher the wage, the lower the
likelihood of belonging to the first labour supply group. The effect is strong
and positive for the next group, which includes all men working less than 40
hours. As we can see, this consist of 25 percent of the sample (predicted). In
contrast, wage has a negative impact on working fulltime (i.e. exactly 40
hours), which implies that for this group, a higher wage does not increase
the labour supply. These effects reflect the classic relationship between
wages and labour supply for men: wages have a positive effect on hours
worked, but reach a turning point and become negative for a very high num-
ber of hours of work. In other words, the substitution effect is stronger than
the income effect. For those working more than 40 hours, the effect of
wages is insignificant. 
The effect of non-labour income is somewhat mixed. It is clear that it low-
ers supply, since the marginal effect in the first group is positive: higher non-
labour income increases the likelihood of not working. It is also positive in the
second group (i.e. part-time work), and then has a negative effect on working
full-time. In other words, those with lower non-labour income are more likely
to work full time. Somewhat surprisingly, the effect runs positive again for
labour supply that is more than 40 hours per week. 
The presence of children has the expected effect. Basically men work more
when children are present. The effect is negative for the first group, then be-
comes positive, and significantly so for the last two groups with the highest
labour supply. The regional patterns are similar to those for women. Men in
the North work considerably more than men in the Centre and the South, the
latter having the lowest labour supply.
Table 13 gives a general idea on model fitting: a comparison between
working hours recorded in the survey and working hours predicted by the
model highlights that, on average, the model seems to overestimate real data,
in particular when dealing with the unemployed. The overestimation for
women is particularly evident in households with one single earner and with
unemployed parents. As for unemployed parents, male and female predictions
are similar: in both cases there is a consistent overestimation. 
Multinomial logit estimations essentially confirm the importance of net
wage in setting labour supply, but marginal effects are highly differentiated
by gender as regards magnitude. This evidence reinforces the concerns
about labour supply disincentives for the additional earner implicit in the
family tax system, especially in the case of women in families with depen-
dent children. 
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Conclusion
The main objective of this paper has been to verify both the distributional
and the labour supply effects of a transition from the current individual tax
system to a family tax system in Italy. In recent years, a move away from the
individual system has been proposed several times and it is still highly topical
in the Italian debate. This debate has mainly focused on the consequences on
income distribution for different households (by size and income level), even
though the reform involves a disincentive on female work effort. If the female
work effort is still of key importance considering that Italian female work par-
ticipation is the lowest in EU15, this paper demonstrates also that foreseeable
distributional effects should be carefully verified with the real income distribu-
tion and with the main characteristics of households along this distribution.
In order to consider the latter implication of the hypothetical reform, we
have implemented a microsimulation, analysing implications for revenue and
identifying the possible winners and losers of the reform. The paper has demon-
strated the somewhat unexpected effects of the reform when we consider house-
hold type. The simulation provides evidence of a positive splitting gain for cou-
ples, with a higher gain for couples with two earners. Single parent households
and households in which the parents (single parent or couple) are unemployed,
in contrast, appear as clear losers from the reform. Generally speaking, these re-
sults are mainly influenced by the distribution of gross incomes prevailing in
Italy. Even though we would expect a higher splitting gain for higher income
concentration (as in the case of one-earner couples), we verify that the higher
gain is for two-earner couples. This result can be explained by the fact that the
average income for two wage-earner households is significantly higher than that
of the one wage-earner type. In other words, the splitting gain in the simulation
strictly increases with gross income, and this income level effect completely
offsets the income concentration effect of the single earner households. 
As regards the relation between splitting gain and family size, the arith-
metic simulations show that the reform is more advantageous for households
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Table 13 – Working hours by type of families: actual and predicted by the model
Women Men
Real Predicted Real Predicted
Two-earner couples 30.3 24.7 35.6 37.0
Couples with a single earner 2.7 12.4 34.6 34.5
Single parents (employed) 29.5 23.4 26.6 31.0
Unemployed parents 3.6 10.6 12.3 29.0
Singles 33.5 26.9 38.4 35.1
17.3 18.7 33.1 34.8
Source: Authors’ estimation.
with three and four dependent children, while households with more than four
children seem to be penalized by this policy. This apparently illogical result is
again strictly related to the actual income distribution of our sample. In Italy,
households with more than four dependent children are mainly located in the
first deciles of income distribution. As a consequence, the gain from French
family splitting due to the large number of children is offset by the fact that
their total family income is in the first bracket. 
The labour supply estimations raise concerns about incentives for labour
supply and support the expectation of a reduction in female and an increase in
male labour supply, which is linked to a gender differentiated effect of the tax
simulation on net incomes. Besides, the male labour supply increase can be
expected almost equally spread across all household types, while the female
labour supply disincentive would be presumably stronger for one-earner or
single parent households. 
Summing up, the French family splitting effect on the labour supply of
women in households with a single earner confirms a disincentive on the work
effort of secondary earners, regarded as the main drawback of this tax system.
In our opinion, the effect on female single parents is particularly striking. In
fact, this type of household is becoming more widespread in western countries
and low income problems, if not poverty, are frequently linked with this
household composition26. 
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Appendix: a simplified analytical version of the splitting gain 
Define splitting gain SG as the difference between income tax due in a
family system and that due in an individual system: if SG > 0 there is a tax in-
crease in a hypothetical change from the individual to the family system, while
if SG < 0 the same reform implies a tax cut.
Losses and gains result both from the household composition, i.e. the num-
ber of children and if it is a single earner family or a household in which both
partners are working, and from the income tax system characteristics, i.e.
number of brackets and rates, level of tax allowances and/or tax credits ac-
corded (e). 
To simplify, consider a household without children in which p = 2 and a tax
code without tax allowances and tax credit. In this example, if the two partners
earn the same income, SG = 0, while it becomes negative if one partner earns
a large proportion of the household income; the greatest SG is accorded to sin-
gle earner households. In other words, in switching from an individual to a
family tax system other things being equal, single earner households are ex-
pected to gain more than others. 
Formally, if the partners’ incomes are equal (y1 = y2),
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SG = 2f(y1) – 2f(y1)
SG = 0 for any tax function T = f(y)
If the partners’ incomes are different, the income tax function must be
known to calculate SG. In such a way, it is possible to evaluate whether the ap-
plication of the tax function to the household income shares (household in-
come divided by 2 in our example) implies moving into lower brackets with
respect to those applied to each partner under an individual system. 
Generally speaking, in a tax system with n brackets, SG is the following: 
where the first term indicates the tax due under the family system (whose tax base
is in the l-th bracket) and the other two represent the tax due by the spouses under
the individual system (with incomes in the k and m brackets respectively). 
In this example, splitting gain exists only if l π m π k. On the contrary, if
incomes are very low they may be taxed in the first bracket, both if individual
income is considered and if household income is shared; in this case SG would
be zero. The same effect there would occur if both individual incomes and the
shared household income are so high that all fall in the top tax bracket. 
To further simplify, consider a tax system with only two brackets (identi-
fied by income level s1) and two tax rates (t1 and t2), and a household in which
only one partner has an income that would be taxed in the second bracket
while the other partner has an income taxed in the first bracket. Under a split-
ting system the household income would be in the first bracket. In this case SG
can be computed as follow: 
Given that t2 and t1, SG would be negative and increasing according to the
difference between the bracket (s1) and the higher income level (y1). SG be-
comes constant when                     
Figure A.1 shows the gain from splitting when Italian tax rates and brack-
ets for 2002 are taken into account. If income is fully concentrated (as for a
single-earner family) the splitting gain is large and increasing with income lev-
el, whereas it is zero for households in which income is perfectly shared be-
tween the spouses27. Figure A.1 also shows that the gain is increasing with in-
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27 Similarly to table 3, figure A.1 and A.2 are built on the Italian tax rates and brackets
in force in 2002, without considering any personal or work-related allowances. This hypo-
 
. 
come for single earner households but stabilizes at 8.100 euros for incomes
over 140.000 euros28. For other income concentration among spouses, SG is
smaller and depends on the different position of family income and individuals
incomes of spouses among tax brackets.
The splitting gain for a couple with two children29 is shown by Figure A2.
Switching from an individual to a family system produces a tax increase for
low-income households, while a tax cut is gained by higher incomes. Given
the level of tax credits for dependent children in force in 2002, the individual
tax system favours couples with two children and less than 45,000 euros, and
implies a tax increase for higher levels of income. As in the previous case, the
gain from splitting is a positive function of the income concentration within
the family and of the level of income. However, in the case of dependent chil-
dren, the strong reduction in progressivity embedded in the family taxation
system gives a tax reduction also to families where the income is perfectly
shared between spouses. 
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thetical splitting gain is the difference between the tax due in a family-splitting system (by
applying the French coefficients and the Italian tax rates) and in the individual tax system.
Therefore a negative splitting gain shows that tax due under the family system is lower than
tax due under the individual system. 
28 In 2002 the last bracket starts at nearly 70.000 euros. As a consequence, in this sim-
plified framework, SG stabilizes at 140.000 euros. 
29 In Figure A.2 the individual tax system employs the child tax credit in force in 2002,
whereas the French system uses a coefficients of 3.
?9000
?8000
?7000
?6000
?5000
?4000
?3000
?2000
?1000
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
5
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
2
5
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
3
5
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
0
4
5
0
0
0
5
0
0
0
0
5
5
0
0
0
6
0
0
0
0
6
5
0
0
0
7
0
0
0
0
7
5
0
0
0
8
0
0
0
0
8
5
0
0
0
9
0
0
0
0
9
5
0
0
0
1
E
+
0
5
1
E
+
0
5
1
E
+
0
5
1
E
+
0
5
1
E
+
0
5
1
E
+
0
5
1
E
+
0
5
1
E
+
0
5
1
E
+
0
5
1
E
+
0
5
2
E
+
0
5
2
E
+
0
5
2
E
+
0
5
2
E
+
0
5
2
E
+
0
5
2
E
+
0
5
2
E
+
0
5
2
E
+
0
5
2
E
+
0
5
2
E
+
0
5
2
E
+
0
5
2
E
+
0
5
2
E
+
0
5
2
E
+
0
5
2
E
+
0
5
2
E
+
0
5
2
E
+
0
5
2
E
+
0
5
2
E
+
0
5
2
E
+
0
5
3
E
+
0
5
Gross?Income
1/2
2/3
3/4
100%
 
Figure A.1 – French family-splitting gain with different income distribution between the
two spouses (without children)
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Figure A2 – French family splitting gain with different income distribution between the two
spouses (with two children and children related credits in the individual taxation system)
